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The ‘terrorist threat’ and European responses
The terrorist attacks in Paris on the editorial offices of Charlie 
Hebdo and on a kosher supermarket were carried out by two 
tiny, heavily armed nuclei acting on the behalf of al-Qaeda and 
the ‘Islamic State’. The attackers were figures known from the 
criminal underground, they had significant prison records, 
and they had been under a police surveillance programme. 
Similarly, one month later, the gunman who opened fire during 
a debate on freedom of speech at a synagogue in Copenhagen 
had a criminal record, and had become radicalized in prison. 
The severity of the threat posed by transnational jihadist 
networks as battle-hardened European fighters return home 
from Syria has been reiterated for more than a year in every 
European capital, and also in Brussels. A key aspect to under-
standing the evolving nature of the threat is the scale of the 
phenomenon: an unprecedented number of radicalized indi-
viduals ready to mobilize into using war weapons in European 
cities, often as copycat behaviour. This has indeed happened, 
and is quite likely to happen again. Nothing about the Paris 
or Copenhagen attacks can be said to have been totally unex-
pected – the attacks were exactly the sort of thing that security 
apparatuses in Europe had been preparing to deal with. And 
yet, for all the efforts at managing the crisis and information 
about the crisis, both episodes unfolded unpredictably, leaving 
far too many victims on the ground. 
The immediate aftermath of the Paris attacks saw uncoordi-
nated anti-terrorist operations in various countries – Belgium, 
Germany, France, Greece and Italy – sometimes meeting armed 
resistance. Despite the evidence of a cross-border dimension 
(the black market in weapons, use of the Internet, connections 
to transnational jihadist networks), European governments were 
quite firm in reiterating denial: these ‘cases’ were not related 
to one another. Security traditionally lies at the heart of sover-
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Summary
Nothing about the recent Paris or Copenhagen terrorist at-
tacks was totally unexpected. Indeed, they were the sort of 
thing that security apparatuses in Europe had been prepar-
ing to have to deal with. Although security responses to ter-
rorism are traditionally considered a quintessential national 
sovereignty prerogative, in the past ten to fifteen years the 
recognition that highly asymmetric security threats respect 
no borders has heightened the EU’s role as a coordinator in 
this policy domain. Some claim that counter-terrorism has 
changed the role and functioning of the EU itself towards 
a more operational character in security matters. Both old 
and new security responses to terrorism have (re-)emerged 
on the agenda of the EU and its member states in the ‘post-
Paris attacks’ phase.
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eignty. Thus, it should come as little surprise that, for all the 
public emphasis on the existence of a threat to European society, 
and even an ‘European 9/11’, governments tend to see threats 
through the prism and strictly within the perimeters of national 
security. The question remains: how would a synchronous (hos-
tage) crisis across EU member-state borders be handled?
French controversies
A dozen anti-terrorism legal reforms have been introduced 
in France in the past two decades. After an initial debate 
on whether the Paris attacks would push European coun-
tries into adopting ‘patriot acts’ along the lines of the ‘war 
on terror’ path set by the USA after the events of 9/11, PM 
Manuel Valls made it clear that basic liberal rule of law and 
civil liberties would stand: the response to an exceptional 
threat would not consist in building a state of exception, 
but in adopting exceptional measures. While no change in 
the criminal code was in sight, the main opposition party 
(Front National) proposed to reintroduce the death penalty. 
The comprehensive ‘new deal’ that the French government 
proposed to French society envisions the strengthening of 
the surveillance apparatus: more police, more intelligence 
and new ‘cyber patrols’, which led to the administrative 
blockage of tens of websites. Only a few months later, on 5 
May, a law that the media immediately labelled ‘France’s 
patriot act’ was passed in the National Assembly with 438 
votes in favour and only 86 against.1 Among other things 
the new controversial bill gives French intelligence agencies 
comprehensive powers of surveillance, allowing them to tap 
the phones and emails of people linked to a ‘terrorist inquiry’ 
without seeking permission from a judge.2 
The public debate has focused on the larger picture of how the 
state should fight radicalization, recognizing that incarcera-
tion can prove counter-productive. The French government 
has echoed the need for building prosecutor skills, increas-
ing prison intelligence, and embarking on broader preven-
tion strategies including social integration: rethinking the 
‘banlieue question’ and urban development. Internationally, 
France would push for a ‘Schengen space with muscles’, as 
well as a French Passenger Name Record (PNR) that would be 
coordinated with a European one. The French interior minister 
toured the big Internet corporations in Silicon Valley, request-
ing more collaboration in granting access to sensitive data that 
may be the object of investigation or prosecution. According to 
the French government, the response rate to its data requests 
has remained unacceptably low. The decision to go ahead with 
the blockage administratif of tens of ‘jihadist sites’ in absence 
of judicial review on the part of a country traditionally cham-
pioning freedom of speech, however, has sparked controversy.3 
Meanwhile, survey results published by The Economist show 
that perceptions about Muslim presence in Europe are quite 
exaggerated:4 while the French, for example, think that 
France has a Muslim population of 31%, the actual figure is 
8%. A survey by the IPSOS institute published by Le Monde5 
shows that 50% of the French believe there is a war going 
on: 84% against jihadism, 16% against Islam. Further, 50% 
of respondents support stepping up the counter-terrorism 
engagement abroad, while 40% want to maintain the same 
level of intervention. Most interestingly, some 95% of those 
surveyed support harsher detention conditions for jihad-
ists; 60–70% support mass eavesdropping, house search-
ing and interrogation in the absence of judicial guarantees. 
These data differ considerably from similar survey results in 
2011, although it should be noted that a larger number of 
French citizens than in the past do not consider Islam as such 
incompatible with French democracy. 
 Several incidents can be noted here. The mayor of Nice con-
gratulated the teachers of an elementary school for bringing 
an eight-year-old pupil to the police for refusing to honour 
to the terrorism victims and declaring that he would stand 
‘with the terrorists’. The controversial French comedian 
Dieudonné M’bala M’bala was arrested for posting ‘Je suis 
Coulibaly’ on his Facebook page and invoking the right of 
free speech; 54 people were arrested in France over ‘hate-
speech comments’ in the weeks following the Paris attacks.6 
Various organizations have denounced the increasingly dis-
criminatory attitudes of the French police when conducting 
random checks on individuals of Arab appearance. While a 
growing number of citizens of Jewish origin were reported 
to be leaving France, there have also been growing numbers 
of attacks on mosques7 – to such an extent that funding has 
been announced for improving security around them, and 
a dialogue/consultation body that includes various Muslim 
communities has been (re-)launched.8  
The EU’s changing role in countering terrorism 
Security responses to terrorism have traditionally been con-
sidered a quintessential prerogative of national sovereignty. 
However, in the past ten to fifteen years, recognition that 
highly asymmetric security threats respect no borders has 
resulted in an expanded role for the EU as a coordinator in 
this policy domain. From almost total irrelevance, the EU 
has emerged as a surprisingly active counter-terrorism actor. 
Since 9/11, the EU has adopted 239 measures against terror-
ism, of which 26 are action plans and strategy documents 
and 15 are laws or directives.9 The new ‘European Agenda on 
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Security’ issued on 28 April 2014 explicitly prioritises ‘ter-
rorism, organised crime and cybercrime as interlinked areas 
with a strong cross-border dimension, where EU action can 
make a real difference.’10 
Although the EU has often struggled to convince member-
state agencies about its added value in the counter-terrorism 
domain, its role has emerged as one of coordination of exist-
ing initiatives, harmonization of national legislation, and 
support to operational work. EU counter-terrorism policies 
constitute a ´broad sectoral approach´, spanning areas such 
as the exchange of information between police and intel-
ligence agencies, critical infrastructure protection, external 
action, border protection and the fight against terrorist 
financing and recruitment.11   
Has counter-terrorism channelled the role and functioning of 
the EU in security matters toward a more operational char-
acter, as some would claim? EU anti-terrorism policies have 
been largely incident-driven. The terrorist attacks in New York 
in 2001, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 all became 
watersheds: these crises have coincided with framework 
decisions, action plans, strategies, declarations, the estab-
lishment of new supra-national security institutions and the 
strengthening of existing ones. The 2002 European Arrest 
Warrant, the 2004 EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the 
2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy are cases in point. In-
between attacks, EU policy-making on counter-terrorism has 
been marked by slowdowns, even ‘anti-terrorism fatigue.’12 
The EU counter-terrorism discourse, too, seems to have been 
driven forward by terrorist attacks. The July 2005 London 
bombings led to substantial changes in the perception of the 
terrorism threat, from an almost exclusive focus on al-Qaeda, 
to  the danger emanating from homegrown terrorists due to 
radicalization processes and recruitment.13  Although terror-
ism has long been framed as a ‘common threat to Europe’, 
the involvement of neighbouring Arab countries in counter-
terrorism strategies (not least, measures like border and 
migration controls) has been quite salient. 
At the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council on 19 January 
2015 EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Federica Mogherini, insisted on framing the current 
situation as a ‘civilizational alliance’, representing terrorism 
as a common threat for European, Arab and Asian coun-
tries.14 The EU Commission declared that it would start using 
the Arabic language in official communications, and that EU 
delegations would be assigned permanent security attachés 
to liaise and share information. Underlying these initiatives is 
the clear aspiration to promote change: one simply does not 
create a role (security attachés) unless a function has been 
envisaged for them. So, we can imagine the deployment of 
personnel to be integrated into a ‘system in becoming’, a 
machinery that is not yet there. The recently issued ‘European 
Agenda on Security’ highlights the deployment of security 
experts in EU Delegations in European Neighborhood Policy 
as a priority, in addition to considering the posting of EU agen-
cies’ liaison officers and magistrates in key third countries.15
While announcing the revision of the 22 measures against 
terrorism adopted in 2013 and a stepping up of its strat-
egy against radicalization, the aforementioned EU Council 
concluded that counter-terrorism will not change the Euro-
pean model of society, which is an open pluralistic society 
where everyone has a place. Cooperation between Europol 
and other European agencies has been strengthened, and a 
greater emphasis put on the fight against terrorism financ-
ing as well as on arms trafficking. Establishing a European 
Counter-Terrorism Centre coordinated by Europol is being 
proposed by the European Commission.16
The main contention in the post-Paris debate has been about 
whose task it is to provide security. EU member states hold 
that this is a prime national responsibility, with the EU’s role 
merely one of support and facilitation. Member-state govern-
ments are also pushing for a swift decision on the establish-
ment of a European Passenger Name Record (PNR) – which 
will mean that flight passenger personal data can be collected, 
stored and analysed for law enforcement purposes. The PNR 
debate has to date been blocked by the Socialist and Democrats 
as well as the Greens in the European Parliament, specifically 
in the LIBE Committee, which has competence on matters 
of security, justice and freedom. The Paris attacks, however, 
have led to tremendous pressure for passing the PNR Direc-
tive. The Commission has been intent on brokering a compro-
mise deal between the Council and the Parliament, adjusting 
data protection guarantees and softening the sharp edges of 
the previous draft so that the proposal could be passed in the 
Parliament. Thus, the PNR seems to have become one of the 
prime measures in EU’s fight against terrorism, as reiterated 
in the Statement of the 12 February informal summit of heads 
of states.17 Generally, PNR opponents hold that adopting such 
a directive before further defining how data protection should 
be in the EU is a bad idea. Another question that remains is 
whether a PNR would actually have prevented the Paris or the 
Copenhagen attacks. The simple answer is that it would not: it 
would probably not even have stopped Coulibaly’s fiancée on 
her way to Syria. There exist plenty of diversionary tactics that 
allow evasion of that form of control. 
Other measures internationally discussed in the ‘post-attack’ 
climate include a strengthening of the Schengen framework 
and of the EU external borders, setting up databases relevant 
to the fight against terrorism based on common risk indica-
tors, as well as Europol setting up focal points and alert lists 
on travelling terrorists. 
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There has been a proliferation of databases and data sets. 
However, the systems for data collection already in use, such 
as Schengen’s SIS II, appear to be under-used. Some states put 
information there, some states do not. Some want to retain 
information that they regard as sensitive. Is this because of tra-
ditional ´national intelligence jealousy´ and bureaucratic cul-
ture? – or is there a broader question of how we conceptualize 
national security? Perhaps there is rather a lack of incentives 
for acting in line with the stated expectations of the system? 
Before establishing new systems, should we not instead ask 
why the old ones are not working in the way they should? 
Let us assume that we need a strategic vision to fight terror-
ism in Europe. Will such a strategy emerge out of new data 
sets, lists and names – or would that be another example of 
unwarranted faith in technological ‘solutionism’? There is 
a gap between the technically possible and the politically 
desirable, and that gap is such that we should probably 
reflect about distinguishing between a strategic, focused 
vision and a reaction to strong public outcry. 
This point is important, because we are talking about excep-
tional measures. When it comes to exceptionality, the ques-
tion of when the return to normalcy can be expected cannot 
be evaded. In Italy, for instance, exceptional anti-terrorism 
measures that were adopted in the 1970s are partially still 
in use. Another salient question concerns whether our inten-
tions and hypotheses about effectiveness are corroborated 
by actual evidence. The literature on the subject has not yet 
managed to handle the broad question of the impact of EU 
counter-terrorism measures, or create consensual bench-
marks. This state of the art casts a shadow on the argument of 
proportionality, as well as on the idea that a legal limitation 
of civil rights should be motivated also – to put it in terms of 
Augustinian realism – by a reasonable prospect of success. 
The main question is whether blanket or mass data collec-
tion and retention can actually help in catching terrorists, or 
whether it will end up violating basic freedoms and civil lib-
erties without delivering much. Collecting data may prove be 
controversial if we do not define the ‘what’ and the ‘to what 
extent’. What can we learn from the NSA scandal and its 
European manifestations? What are the limits of data collec-
tion and retention? Under what judicial review mechanism is 
this practice to be authorized?
Conclusions
Summing up: The EU has an important role in terms of law har-
monization. Today there is a need for normative updating and 
new harmonization of legislation following UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 2178 (2014)18 on the prevention of ‘recruiting, 
organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel 
to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for 
the purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in 
terrorist acts’. Inside the EU there exist significant differences in 
terms of legal frameworks and implementation, leading some 
countries to become ´safe havens´. Indeed, it could be argued 
that addressing these problems should have higher priority 
than creating and managing the 28 PNRs that are expected to 
be merged into a new EU Passenger Name Record. 
The efforts made by EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles 
de Kerchove, also through interacting directly with the broader 
European public through the media, seem to involve advocat-
ing further harmonization (beginning with the definition of 
who is a jihadist) while offering a type of support that may 
help the system to evolve and avoid the pitfalls of national seg-
mentation. Announced to the Belgian daily Le Soir, the idea 
of a cell of terrorism experts that would be activated in case 
of a crisis, while helping with creating counter-narratives that 
fight jihadist propaganda, works in that direction.19 
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